

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND  
UNIT 30400  
APO AE 09131

DIRECTIVE  
NUMBER 55-5

17 April 2002

**PLANS AND POLICY**  
Implementation of The Vienna Document 1999  
of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures

- 
1. **Summary.** This directive prescribes policies, responsibilities, and procedures for U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) implementation of and compliance with provisions of the Vienna Document 1999 (VDOC 99) as well as other Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) promulgated by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC).
  2. **Applicability.** This directive applies to USEUCOM and its component commands.
  3. **Internal Controls.** This directive does not contain internal control provisions and is not subject to the requirements of the internal management control program. For USEUCOM and subordinate joint activities, the applicable internal control directive is ED 50-8, Internal Management Control Program.
  4. **Suggested Improvements.** The proponent for this directive is the Arms Control Branch, Treaty and Threat Reduction Division, Plans and Policy Directorate. Suggested improvements should be forwarded to HQ USEUCOM/ECJ5-T-AC, Unit 30400, APO AE 09131.
  5. **References.** See Appendix A.
  6. **Background.** The VDOC 99 of the Negotiations on CSBMs was adopted at the 269th Plenary Meeting of the FSC of the OSCE held on 16-19 November 1999. VDOC 99 is a politically binding agreement between the 55 OSCE Member States. It modifies earlier versions by improving and updating CSBMs to better address technological advances and changing security and military environments. VDOC 99 is the most recent of the CSBM agreements and was preceded by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the 1986 Stockholm Agreement, and previous versions of the Vienna Document in 1990, 1992, and 1994. The

---

This Directive supercedes ED 55-5, dated 21 Apr 93.

zone of application (ZOA) of the VDOC 99 is the whole of Europe, east to the Ural Mountains, to include the adjoining sea area and airspace, and the non-European territory of the participating former Soviet republics, except Russia. The geographic areas and territorial possessions of Canada and the United States are not included in the ZOA.

7. **Summary of VDOC 99 Provisions.** (See reference 1 for the complete text of VDOC 99.) In general, participating States will:

a. conduct an annual exchange of information on military forces in the ZOA, plans for the deployment of major weapons and equipment systems, defense planning and doctrine, force planning, defense expenditures for the previous fiscal year, and budgets;

b. consult and cooperate with each other about regarding unusual military activities and hazardous incidents of a military nature which threaten peace and stability within the ZOA;

c. develop a program for periodic visits to military air bases, formations, and facilities in the ZOA, increased contacts between military representatives of all other participating States, and demonstrations of new types of weapon and equipment systems deployed within the ZOA;

d. give written notice in an agreed format to all other participating States at least 42 days in advance of notifiable military activities in the ZOA;

e. provide for observation of certain military notifiable activities by representatives of all participating States;

f. submit detailed annual calendars depicting planned military activities subject to notification; and provide 2-year notification of activities involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks (BT) or 2,000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs) or 900 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm caliber and above);

g. permit inspections of geographic areas in the ZOA as requested by participating States and unit evaluations to verify the information provided annually;

h. hold a meeting each year to discuss present and future implementation of VDOC 99 CSBMs;

i. use the OSCE communications network for transmission of messages relating to CSBMs contained in VDOC 99.

8. **Policy.** USEUCOM is charged by the U.S. government (USG) with ensuring compliance with all aspects of VDOC 99 by the forces under its control. This does not relieve component commands and subordinate units of responsibilities for ensuring operational security (OPSEC) and force protection for the units and forces under their command. While VDOC 99 leaves little room for refusing or denying inspections or evaluations, any circumstance

deemed by component commanders to violate reasonable safeguards for the forces involved should be transmitted to USEUCOM immediately. These circumstances should be held to the absolute minimum, as the final decision to deny or refuse inspections or evaluations will take high-level USG approval and resolution.

9. **Responsibilities.**

a. JCS will (included for information only):

(1) represent the U.S. military in the USG National Security Council interagency national security coordination process relating to VDOC 99;

(2) coordinate with the Services and USEUCOM, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to establish U.S. military policy and procedures for implementation and compliance with provisions of the VDOC 99;

(3) provide military policy guidance relating to VDOC 99 to USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USJFCOM and other affected commands, as required;

(4) exercise oversight of U.S. military implementation of and compliance with provisions of VDOC 99;

(5) coordinate with and assist the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Department of State (DoS) in implementation of and compliance with the provisions of VDOC 99;

(6) participate as a permanent member of Department of Defense (DoD) Compliance Review Group (CRG) and raise to the CRG for resolution any compliance issue not covered by existing policy.

b. U.S. Defense Attaché Offices, in accordance with reference 2, will:

(1) provide observers to exercises, evaluators, or visitors to air base visits, as requested;

(2) support VDOC 99 inspections and evaluations by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), as requested;

(3) provide support to the U.S. liaison team when a host nation (HN) is undergoing a VDOC 99 inspection.

c. Commander-in-Chief, USEUCOM (USCINCEUR) will:

(1) establish and coordinate policy and procedures for implementation of and compliance with the VDOC 99 provisions;

(2) coordinate and establish a memorandum of understanding with DTRA to define functions, responsibilities, duties, and organizational relationships for U.S. forces implementation of and compliance with VDOC 99.

d. ECJ1 (Manpower, Personnel and Administration Directorate) will:

(1) provide staff coordination on VDOC 99 matters as requested by Director, ECJ5;

(2) provide information annually on personnel strength as required by VDOC 99.

e. ECJ2 (Intelligence Directorate) will:

(1) provide staff coordination on VDOC 99 matters as requested by Director, ECJ5;

(2) monitor other OSCE participating States' activities, in coordination with DIA and the intelligence community, for compliance and expeditiously identify those activities where compliance is in doubt.

f. ECJ3 (Operations Directorate) will:

(1) provide staff coordination on VDOC 99 matters as requested by Director, ECJ5;

(2) provide command center capability for transmission and tracking of inspection and evaluation notifications from initial notification to conclusion;

(3) generate and maintain Command Duty Officer (CDO) checklists to ensure prompt notification of appropriate USEUCOM personnel/organizations, DTRA-On Site Europe (DTRA-OSE), and component command headquarters for VDOC 99/CSBM reporting, impending on-site inspections, evaluations, or other VDOC 99-related actions;

(4) provide ECJ5-T information on USEUCOM's planned exercises and events to ensure VDOC 99/CSBM notifications are submitted to the Joint Staff (JS) for U.S. and NATO coordination. Notification and annual calendar information will be prepared for all exercises or activities in which U.S. forces are likely to exceed VDOC 99 notification thresholds and when U.S. forces will participate in Allied or NATO exercises which might exceed the notification thresholds.

g. ECJ4 (Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate) will provide staff coordination on VDOC 99 matters as requested by Director, ECJ5.

h. ECJ5 (Plans and Policy Directorate) will:

(1) act as USEUCOM Office of Primary Responsibility for VDOC 99 policy matters;

- (2) provide theater guidance for submission of notifications and draft annual calendars and forecasts;
- (3) coordinate component command's draft calendar inputs with allies and forward to the JS;
- (4) provide guidance to component commands for planning observation and evaluation activities;
- (5) select, prepare, and debrief U.S. VDOC 99 observers and air base visitors;
- (6) coordinate with DTRA-OSE in planning and execution of the escort mission for U.S. units undergoing inspections, evaluations or observation visits;
- (7) initiate, compile and verify, with input from USCENTCOM and USJFCOM, data and information on equipment, troops and activities in the ZOA as required by VDOC 99;
- (8) operate and use a Compliance Monitoring and Tracking System (CMTS) terminal to generate, approve, compile, and transmit notifications, invitations and other messages as required by VDOC 99.

i. ECPA (Public Affairs Directorate) will:

- (1) coordinate public releases with the American Embassy (AMEMBASSY) Defense Attaché Office (DAO), U.S. Information Service (USIS), ECJ3, ECJ5, and other agencies, as required, about USG participation in exercises;
- (2) coordinate public releases regarding inspections of U.S. installations or units with AMEMBASSY DAO; USIS; DTRA-OSE; USEUCOM staff; and other agencies, as required. Where U.S. forces are collocated with HN forces, public affairs responsibility will be retained by the host State. U.S. assistance may be provided, if requested. U.S. DAOs in Allied countries should make this offer known to host States and advise USEUCOM-ECPA and ECJ5-T and DTRA-OSE;
- (3) provide public affairs guidance and contingency statements for use by the AMEMBASSY, component commands, and subordinate units, as required. The following statement is provided to use in response to queries regarding OSCE inspection activities after coordination with the host State: "Inspections are an integral part of the Confidence and Security Building Measures agreed to in Vienna. The request of (nation) to conduct an inspection of (location) does not in any way indicate a crisis or heightening of tensions. Each Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe participating State has agreed to give full cooperation to such requests, and we have been assured by (host nation) that inspectors from (nation) will be accorded full rights and privileges in accordance with the Vienna Document 99."

j. ECJA (Office of the Legal Advisor) will:

- (1) provide legal guidance, as required, regarding the interpretation and implementation of the VDOC 99;
- (2) coordinate with DoD General Counsel and other legal offices as appropriate.

k. Component commands will:

- (1) establish and coordinate policy and procedures for subordinate units for implementation and compliance with VDOC 99, and specific requirements outlined in the subsequent paragraphs;
  - (2) initiate, and submit to USEUCOM for approval, data and information on equipment, troops and activities in the ZOA as required by VDOC 99 and specific requirements outlined in subsequent paragraphs;
  - (3) provide data for the annual exchange of military information;
  - (4) provide information and participate in annual discussions, seminars, and study visits to increase transparency;
  - (5) provide risk reduction data;
  - (6) prepare for and conduct U.S. hosted military formation and facility visit and observation programs;
  - (7) provide notification of certain military activities as defined in Appendix F;
  - (8) submit an annual calendar of certain military events as defined in Appendix H;
  - (9) participate in passive inspections and evaluations as applicable;
  - (10) conduct observation programs of U.S. air force activities, U.S. land-based naval air forces activities, U.S. ground forces and airborne activities, or U.S. amphibious forces activities as appropriate.
- l. U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe (MARFOREUR), and U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (USNAVEUR) will operate and use the CMTS to generate and transmit notifications and other messages as required by VDOC 99 and specific requirements outlined in subsequent appendices.

10. **Procedures**. See Appendixes.

11. **Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting**. Component commands will report and make recommendations concerning the clarification of questions, operation, and implications that may arise from the implementation of VDOC 99 to USEUCOM as requested.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL

DANIEL J. PETROSKY  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Chief of Staff

AVA N. WEBB-SHARPLESS  
Lt Col, USAF  
Adjutant General

Appendixes:

- A – References
- B – Annual Exchange of Military Information
- C – Defense Planning
- D – Risk Reduction
- E – Contacts
- F – Notification of Certain Military Activities
- G – Observation of Certain Military Activities
- H – Annual Calendars
- I – Constraining Provisions
- J – Compliance and Verification
- K – Guidance for USEUCOM personnel who have contact with  
Vienna Document 1999 Inspectors/Evaluators/Observers
- L – Liaison Team Responsibilities
- M – USEUCOM Liaison Team Members Instructions

DISTRIBUTION:

P Plus

JOINT STAFF J5

DAO ANKARA

DAO ATHENS

DAO BELGRADE

DAO BERN

DAO BONN

DAO BRUSSELS

DAO BUCHAREST  
DAO BUDAPEST  
DAO COPENHAGEN  
DISTRIBUTION: (continued)  
DAO DUBLIN  
DAO THE HAGUE  
DAO HELSINKI  
DAO LISBON  
DAO LONDON  
DAO MADRID  
DAO MOSCOW  
DAO PRAGUE  
DAO OSLO  
DAO PARIS  
DAO ROME  
DAO SOFIA  
DAO STOCKHOLM  
DAO TIRANA  
DAO VIENNA  
DAO WARSAW  
DAO ZAGREB  
AMEMBASSY ALMA ATA  
AMEMBASSY ASHKHABAD  
AMEMBASSY BAKU  
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK  
AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA  
AMEMBASSY CHISINAU  
AMEMBASSY KIEV  
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG CITY  
AMEMBASSY MINSK  
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK  
AMEMBASSY RIGA  
AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO  
AMEMBASSY TALLINN  
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT  
AMEMBASSY TBILISI  
AMEMBASSY VILNIUS  
AMEMBASSY YEREVAN  
AMEMBASSY ZAGREB  
USJFCOM  
DTRA  
DIA/DAH



## Appendix A

### References

References listed below contain key USG or JCS interpretations and policy established during the Conference on Confidence-and-Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe implementation, as well as additional guidance developed for the VDOC 99.

1. Vienna Document 1999 (VDOC 99), 16 Nov 1999.
2. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 2320.01A, 31 May 2001.
3. Memorandum of Understanding Between USEUCOM, USLANTCOM (renamed USJFCOM) and OSIA (integrated into DTRA) for Mutual Liaison and Support Operations in Implementation of the Vienna Document 1992 (VDOC 92).
4. Bilateral Agreement, Vienna Document 1990, Federal Republic of Germany.
5. Bilateral Agreement, Vienna Document 1990, Kingdom of the Netherlands.
6. Bilateral Agreement, Vienna Document 1990, Kingdom of Spain.
7. Bilateral Agreement, Vienna Document 1990, Republic of Iceland.
8. Bilateral Agreement, Vienna Document 1990, Republic of Italy.
9. Bilateral Agreement, Vienna Document 1990, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

## Appendix B

### Annual Exchange of Military Information

An exchange of detailed military information must be accomplished among the participating States no later than (NLT) 15 December of each year. In order to allow sufficient time for review, USEUCOM component commands, ECJ1, and DoD reporting agencies will submit required data to ECJ5-T on or about 15 November of each year. The actual date of the data submission, along with the data exchange schedule, will be issued to responsible organizations via separate correspondence in September of each year.

1. Information on Military Forces. Component commands will submit the required military information via CMTS and participate in a data exchange review prior to USEUCOM's data submission to the JS. Component commands may also be requested to participate in the JS and OSD data reviews prior to the US submission to the OSCE.
2. Data and Information and Plans for Deployment of New Major Weapon and Equipment Systems. Component commands will provide to ECJ5-T NLT 15 November each year the information and notification required on plans to deploy a new major weapon or equipment system in the coming year into the ZOA. This includes the plans to deploy a system for the first time in the ZOA. In addition, plans to remove a major weapon or equipment system from service will also be reported to ECJ5-T NLT 15 November of each year.

## Appendix C

### Defense Planning

When directed by USEUCOM, component commands will provide information and participate in annual discussions, seminars, and study visits to increase transparency.

## Appendix D

### Risk Reduction

Component commands will provide information and data to USEUCOM in response to a request for information on unusual military activity occurring in the ZOA; promptly report hazardous incidents involving U.S. Forces in the ZOA; and host visits to dispel concerns about military activity. All activities satisfying this provision for risk reduction will ensure that OPSEC and force protection requirements are articulated and satisfied.

## Appendix E

### Contacts

Under the provision for contacts, participating States are obligated to host an air base visit and military formation/facility or military activity (below thresholds) observation visit once every five years. Active visits are those which the U.S. sends representatives, and passive visits are those which the U.S. hosts. Also as part of the provision on contacts, participating States are obligated to demonstrate new types of major weapon and equipment systems.

#### 1. Air Base Visits:

a. Active Air Base Visits: USEUCOM acts on behalf of the JS in organizing, planning, and conducting visits to other participating States' air base visits. The USG will normally send two visitors to each air base visit hosted by another participating State. One visitor will normally be a member of the DAO accredited to the country in which the visit occurs. USEUCOM nominates an officer for the second visitor position. Sending headquarters will ensure visitors have valid passports and visas if required. U.S. representatives are required to generate an after action report within 10 days of return from the visit. At a minimum the report should include a list of participants by State, detailed visit itinerary and discussion of areas visited and personal observations.

b. Passive Air Base Visits: VDOC signatories are required to host an air base visit once every five years. The USG decision to host a visit will be reached through consultations with the DoS, JS, USEUCOM and the component commands. Once the USG decision is made, consultations with the host State and NATO will occur.

(1) The responsibility for preparation and conduct of U.S. hosted air base visit programs is delegated to the component commands. USAFE will be responsible for the conduct of air base visit programs of USAFE activities; USNAVEUR will be responsible for the conduct of air base visit programs of land-based naval air forces activities.

(2) Invitations to other participating States will be made by the DoS and the host State. Up to two visitors from each participating State will be invited.

(3) The overall length of the visit will be determined by consultation with the host State. VDOC 99 specifies that the airbase visit will last a minimum of twenty-four hours.

(4) Visitors will normally arrive at a point of entry designated by the host State, usually a major commercial international travel airport or border crossing. The host State will normally escort the visitors to the U.S. base, as necessary, and then pass escort responsibility to U.S. representatives, unless this responsibility was passed to the USG at the point of entry. Escort responsibility will be returned to the host State upon completion of the visit.

(5) Upon arrival at a designated assembly point and entry to the base, the visitors will be greeted and welcomed by a USEUCOM or component command flag officer and the air base commander or deputy. Following the welcome, the visitors will be provided an unclassified briefing by the air base commander. The air base commander briefing's objective is to provide

the visitors with information on the purpose and function of the air base and current activity, including appropriate information on the air force structure and operations so as to explain the specific role and subordination of the air base. The briefing should include, at a minimum, the units operating from the base, the number of personnel/aircraft (by type), and the unclassified missions/functions of those aircraft. The orientation briefing should also describe constraints on the visitors' access due to security or safety restrictions. Tenant unit commanders or their senior representatives should be in attendance and should be prepared to discuss their unclassified unit functions and missions.

(6) The in-briefing should be followed by a tour of the facility where the visitors will have an opportunity to view all aircraft types at the base. The degree to which access is granted to aircraft is at the discretion of the base and/or tenant unit commanders. Access to sensitive points may be denied. Commanders should strive to minimize the impact on normal activities during the visit.

(7) The visitors will have the opportunity to observe normal flight operations and to communicate with commanders and base personnel. These personnel should be as open and forthright as OPSEC considerations permit. The component command will provide base personnel the necessary guidance to comply with OPSEC requirements. Unit commanders will ensure their personnel and local escorts receive security awareness training prior to the visit.

(8) Social activities are an important part of the air base visit program. A formal dinner should be included as part of the program. The senior U.S. commander (USAFE or USEUCOM), or their deputy, should serve as host. Care should be taken to include the host State's senior escort in this function as co-host.

(9) The extent of U.S. responsibilities for some aspects of the air base visit will be determined in consultation with the host State. Component commands should be prepared to provide lodging on the visited base or to arrange commercial lodging in a local facility, local transportation, meals, and other arrangements.

(10) USEUCOM will participate in the planning of visits to U.S. air bases and will be available to advise local commanders about the conduct of the air base visit. USEUCOM will assist, as necessary, in arranging translation/interpretation support for the program.

(11) Following the air base visits, the component command, in coordination with the base commander, is responsible to prepare an after action report to ECJ5-T within 30 days following completion of the visit. The report should include, as a minimum, detailed itinerary, list of visitors by country, major items of interest, questions asked and answers provided, lessons learned and recommendations, plus the costs associated with the visit, by major category, estimated where necessary.

2. Visits to Military Formations and Facilities and Observation of Certain Military Activity. In addition to the air base visit described above, each VDOC signatory State must host either a visit to a military facility or formation, or host an observation of a below threshold military activity once every five years. The responsibility for preparation and conduct of U.S. hosted military formation and facility visit and observation programs is delegated to the component commands.

Modalities governing the military formation and facility visit, as well as the observation activity, will be the same as stated above for the air base visit program.

3. Demonstration of New Types of Major Weapon and Equipment Systems. Demonstrations are required for major weapon and equipment systems introduced into the ZOA for the first time. Only equipment required to be included in the annual exchange of information will require demonstration. Consultation between DoS, JS, USEUCOM, and NATO will verify the need to demonstrate a weapon or equipment system. Responsibility for planning and conduct of the demonstration is delegated to the component command operating the equipment. If more than one component command operates the equipment, USEUCOM will designate a component command to plan and conduct the demonstration. Modalities governing the equipment demonstration will be the same as stated above for the air base visit program.

## Appendix F

## Notification of Certain Military Activities

1. Notification of activities that exceed thresholds as outlined in VDOC 99 must be provided by the USG through diplomatic channels at least 42 days in advance of the activity. Notifiable military activities include:

a. land force activities, in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components, of at least 9,000 troops or at least 250 BTs or at least 500 ACVs or at least 250 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm caliber and above). If organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division (notification will include participation of air force activities when it is foreseen that in the course of the activity 200 or more sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters, will be flown).

b. an associated amphibious landing, heliborne landing, or parachute assault involving at least 3,000 troops.

2. To meet requirements for coordination within USG and NATO, the JS requires USEUCOM draft input NLT 70 days in advance of the activity. Component commands will forward their draft input to USEUCOM NLT 77 days in advance of the activity in order to allow sufficient time for resolution of problems and coordination with Allies.

3. Activities conducted without prior notification to the troops involved (alerts) are exempt from the 42-day advance notification requirement. The JS requires USEUCOM notification of a notifiable alert activity NLT seven (7) days before the start of the activity. Component commands will provide USEUCOM notification information on these activities NLT 14 days in advance of the activity in order to allow sufficient time for resolution of problems and coordination with Allies.



## Appendix G

### Observation of Certain Military Activities

1. The VDOC 99 provides for observation of any military activity in the zone which exceeds the certain thresholds. Observable military activities include:
  - a. land force activities, in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components, of at least 13,000 troops or 300 BTs or 500 ACVs or 250 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm caliber and above).
  - b. an associated amphibious landing, heliborne landing, or parachute assault involving at least 3,500 troops.
2. The State party where the activity is taking place must host an observation for the entire period that any threshold is exceeded. Up to two representatives from each participating State are allowed to attend the observation.
3. Active Observations. Active observations are those observations in which the U.S. sends representatives to observe the military activity. The U.S. sends two observers to every observable activity. One observer normally will be a member of the DAO accredited to the country in which the observation occurs. USEUCOM will nominate an officer from the staff or a component command for the second observer position. Observers must have valid passports and visa if required for entry into the country. Observers are required to prepare an after action report within 10 days upon completion of the observation. The report at a minimum will include a list of other observers, detailed itinerary, and summary of observations.
4. Passive Observations. Passive observations are those observations in which the U.S. is a participant in the military activity being observed or is acting as the host for the activity. The U.S. will participate in hosting observers when delegated responsibility by the State on whose territory the observable activity will occur.
  - a. The responsibility for preparation and conduct of U.S.-hosted observation programs is delegated to the component commands: USAREUR will be responsible for the conduct of observation programs of U.S. ground forces and airborne activities; MARFOREUR will be responsible for the conduct of observation programs of U.S. amphibious forces activities, and USAFE is responsible for the conduct of observation programs of U.S. air forces activities. Unless otherwise directed, component commands will be responsible for conduct of the observation program in the exercise area after the host country has welcomed the observers. Component commands will establish procedures for the planning and conduct of observation programs. Coordination between component commands is encouraged. The component command conducting the observation program will submit draft itineraries to USEUCOM NLT 70 days prior to start of the exercise for coordination with the JS. Costs of observation programs, including hotel/billeting arrangements, transportation, meals, and all other related expenses, should be included in exercise planning estimates and will be funded by the component command responsible for the exercise.

b. In addition to the observation program requirements outlined in VDOC 99, the guidance outlined below will apply to observations planned and conducted by the component commands:

(1) Duration of the observation program will be from the time that agreed thresholds for observation are met or exceeded until, for the last time during the activity, the thresholds for observation are no longer met.

(2) Observation of military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved (alerts) will be conducted starting seventy-two hours after the initiation of the activity, so long as the observation threshold has been met, and will last as long as thresholds for observation are met or exceeded.

(3) Official personnel and troops taking part in an observed military activity, as well as other armed personnel located in the area of the military activity, will be adequately informed of the presence, status, and functions of the observers.

(4) U.S. forces stationed in the host State or participating in activities in the host State will not be required to permit observation of restricted locations, installations, or defense sites or inside operations centers and crew compartments of combat vehicles.

(5) Observers will be allowed to use their personal binoculars, maps, photo and video cameras, dictaphones, and hand-held passive night-vision devices, which will be subject to examination and approval by the host State. Requests by observers to use other equipment will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(6) Observers will be permitted to use cameras, dictaphones, and other permitted observation equipment outside of command posts, communications centers, and combat vehicles. Any restrictions on the right to take photographs should be announced at the observation point in question. General restrictions on photography of sensitive points should be explained during the initial observation briefing.

(7) The observers will be provided with appropriate observation equipment. Normally, this equates to one pair of binoculars per observer. Component commands will also make available for each observer sufficient inclement weather equipment or special clothing, including rain gear, cold weather parkas, and mittens, as necessary.

(8) Local transportation will be provided so that the observers are in position before the start of the observation program. The component command responsible for the observation will provide observers with appropriate means of transportation during the observation program. In preparing the observation program, every effort should be made to maximize the number of hours actually visiting or observing exercise activity and to minimize the time spent in transit. Helicopters should be used to the greatest extent practical.

(9) The observation program will begin with a briefing on the purpose, basic situation, and phases of the activity and will explain any changes from the notification. Observers will be provided a map of the area of the military activity with a scale of not more than 1:250,000 depicting the initial tactical situation.

(10) Observers will be guided in the area of military activity by a U.S. escort team. The component command will designate, as the senior USEUCOM escort officer, a colonel/Navy captain (O-6), who will serve as host on a daily basis, and such additional escorts as are deemed necessary to provide assistance to observers. Escorts with language capability in German, French, Russian, and other European languages are recommended.

(11) During the observation program, observers will be briefed on a daily basis, with the help of maps, on the various phases of the activity and their development. The daily briefing should include a handout if practical, a sketch, overlay, or other depiction of the current tactical situation. Observers will be informed about their geographic positions at every observation point (this can be listed on the daily schedule). Information on air or naval activity related to the ground force activity will be briefed by uniformed representatives of the appropriate military service.

(12) Observers will be provided opportunities to directly observe forces participating in the activity so that observers get an impression of the flow of the activity. They will be given opportunities to observe or visit major combat and support units (below division level) participating in the activity, as well as subordinate units, and to communicate with commanders and troops. Commanders or designated representatives of participating formations will inform observers of the mission of their respective units.

(13) Observers will be given opportunities to eat lunch in the field with soldiers of units being visited. Troop rations are suitable. Breakfast and supper meals in the hotel where observers are billeted should normally be arranged as informal buffets or the like.

(14) If practical, at least one observer from each country should be given an overview of the exercise from the air via helicopter flight. Helicopters will be provided by the host State or the U.S. by arrangement with the host State. Observers will be provided ear plugs for noise protection.

(15) At least once during the observation, the itinerary should include a stop at an activity during the hours of darkness or twilight, if this can be arranged. The purpose is to set the example of using the observation period productively and encouraging reciprocal opportunities to observe a representative sample of the full range of exercise activities.

(16) Information in oral briefings, question and answer sessions, and formal remarks at receptions or dinners will be presented in English and translated simultaneously, where possible. Where simultaneous translation is not practical, translation will be first in the language of the host country, then in Russian. Translators can be requested from the DoS or DTRA. Written material essential to the observation program, such as the daily schedule and administrative instructions on hotel and telephone services and the like, will be made available in English, the language of the host country, and Russian. All other non-essential information provided by U.S. hosts need only be in English.

(17) Observers will be provided access to telephones or other means of communications and afforded opportunities for timely communications with their embassies or other official

missions/consulates. The host State is not obliged to cover the communications expenses of the observers.

(18) Observers will be provided appropriate board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the observation program and, when necessary, medical care.

(19) Social activities are an important part of the observation program, but should not intrude on the observation of exercise activity. It may be appropriate for the USEUCOM component command to arrange a formal dinner for observers during the observation program, if agreed to by the host State. At this dinner, the senior U.S. commander directing the observable activity, or his deputy, should serve as host. Care should be taken to include the host State's senior escort in this function as co-host and include host State officials and escorts as well. This dinner should be held during the core observation program when the active maneuver phase is being held.

(20) Subject to guidance from the host State, opportunities may be provided to permit observers to do some shopping or sightseeing on their own.

(21) Component commands will provide after action report on the observation program to USEUCOM ECJ5-T NLT 30 days after the program has ended. This report should include, as a minimum, the following items: a copy of the complete itinerary; a list of participants, by State, a copy of any handouts, maps, and sketches given to the visitors; a synopsis of visitor questions and requests and the results; an indication of areas in which observers were interested; any problems or issues requiring USEUCOM resolution; any information that should be passed to the JS or NATO Allies; a list of observation expenses by major category, lodging/meals, transportation, etc.; and recommendations.

## Appendix H

## Annual Calendars

1. The VDOC 99 requires that each participating State exchange with all other participating States an annual calendar of its notifiable military activities for the subsequent calendar year.
2. Additionally, military activities involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks must be forecast two years in advance.
3. The JS requires USEUCOM draft input NLT 1 October of each year. Component commands and ECJ3 will forward their draft input to USEUCOM ECJ5-T, NLT 15 September of each year to permit time to resolve ambiguities and coordinate with USG and NATO. USAREUR and USNAVEUR will coordinate with USAFE to ensure agreement of information on supporting air activity.
4. Information should be provided in three sections:
  - a. a chronological listing of those activities in which the U.S. participation is expected to exceed the notification threshold
  - b. a forecast two years out of activities expected to exceed 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks.
  - c. a list of NATO activities in which U.S. participation is less than the notification threshold but where the total Allied participation may exceed the threshold. In all cases, levels of Allied participation should be included, if known.

## Appendix I

### Constraining Provisions

Exercise restrictions denoted in VDOC 99 and CJCSI 2320.01A apply.

## Appendix J

## Compliance and Verification

## 1. Active Inspections.

a. In accordance with reference 3, DTRA is responsible for organizing, planning, and conducting active VDOC 99 inspections. DTRA will man and train the VDOC 99 inspection teams. USEUCOM will provide appropriate assistance at the request of DTRA.

b. DTRA is responsible for transportation of the VDOC 99 inspection team for conduct of inspections. DTRA may request USEUCOM flight support through USEUCOM, ECJ3, when necessary.

## 2. Passive Inspections.

a. Passive inspections are the responsibility of the State on whose territory the inspection takes place. The territory of the U.S. is not subject to VDOC 99 inspection and the USG, therefore, cannot be host to an inspection. The USG role during a passive inspection is limited to advising U.S. forces inside the inspection area and, at the host State's discretion, assisting the host State. USG policy is to provide the DTRA liaison team assistance in an inspection on Allied territory where U.S. forces are exercising. USEUCOM will normally augment the DTRA team with one or two component command officers knowledgeable of the particular exercise.

b. Provisions of the VDOC 99 gives each State the right to request an inspection of another State within the ZOA for VDOC 99. Technically, the inspection is directed against a geographic area specified by the inspecting State, not against a specific unit or activity. The "Specified Area" should consist of terrain where notifiable military activities are conducted or are suspected of taking place.

c. USEUCOM may receive inspection notification from a number of sources: an Ally who has been notified; from the DAO of the country involved; or most probably from DTRA Headquarters. ECJ3 has the responsibility for notification of component commands and tracking inspection progress through established checklists. USEUCOM command center will pass the inspection notification information via telephone and electronic message at FLASH precedence to all component command operation centers, DTRA-OSE, and designated ECJ5 arms control officers. Upon notification of an inspection, USEUCOM component commands will first determine which, if any, U.S. forces are engaged in out-of-garrison activities in the specified area, and which, if any, U.S. installations are located in specified area. Component commands will forward a positive or negative response for the presence of U.S. assets in the specified area to USEUCOM CDO via FLASH message and telephonically within one hour. USEUCOM command center will provide this information via FLASH message and telephonically to DTRA-OSE for determination and coordination with the component command on the requirement for liaison team support for the inspection.

d. When a U.S. exercise or activity is occurring in the specified area, the exercise or activity directing headquarters will provide the DTRA liaison team with a knowledgeable officer with whom to consult. This individual will be prepared to brief inspectors on the nature and scope of

the activity, if required. If a NATO command is conducting the activity, the commander of the U.S. contingent in the exercise/activity will provide a knowledgeable officer to consult with the DTRA liaison team concerning the U.S. role in the activity and to brief the inspectors, if required, on the nature and scope of the U.S. participation in the activity.

e. Briefings are the responsibility of the host country; however, the U.S. will provide assistance and briefings as appropriate on out-of-garrison activity. If requested, the briefing should be given by the commander of the unit participating in the activity or his designated representative. As a matter of policy, USEUCOM will not provide briefings on garrisoned units.

f. Commanders will ensure troops, other armed personnel, and officials in the specified area are adequately informed of the presence, status, and functions of the inspectors and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel.

g. Planned or on-going training is not to be terminated, nor will forces be moved back to garrison early based purely on the fact that the inspection area encompasses a training activity. As is appropriate for all training activities, commanders may enforce normal OPSEC procedures whether or not a VDOC 99 inspection is being conducted. In the event inspectors visit a U.S. unit in the specified area and choose to ask questions, their questions will be answered in an open and straightforward manner to the greatest extent possible. If a complete answer would require divulging classified information, simply tell the inspectors the information is classified and the question cannot be answered.

h. Access to military garrisons, air bases, or other defense installations.

(1) Military garrisons, air bases, or other defense installations are excluded from inspection. In practice, USEUCOM does not allow access to any U.S. controlled installation for inspection.

(2) Aerial overflight of military installations constitutes a form of access. Commanders will oppose overflight of garrison locations due to access exemptions for defense and military installations.

(3) The only exceptions to the (1) and (2) above are the Military Training Areas (MTAs) at Grafenwoher and Hohenfels as the size of these installations could contain a notifiable force.

(4) Terrain outside of the excluded areas and units exercising out of garrison are subject to inspection.

i. In the specified inspection area, inspectors are permitted access, entry, and unobstructed survey, except for areas and sensitive points to which access is normally denied or controlled. Access to military/defense installations (except for the MTAs noted above) and the interiors of military vehicles, aircraft, and ships can be denied to inspectors. Inspectors may be excluded from command posts, communications facilities and other sensitive areas.

j. The inspection team will be permitted to use cameras, dictaphones, and other permitted observation equipment outside of command posts, communications centers, and combat vehicles.



Any restrictions on the right to take photographs should be announced at the point in question. General restrictions on photography of sensitive points should be explained during the briefing.

k. Units in the field will report instances in which members of inspection teams inspect U.S. units. Reports will be forwarded through the appropriate component command, to USEUCOM, ECJ5-T, via IMMEDIATE-precedence message. Reports will include the unit designation and location, the time of contact with inspectors, any questions asked by inspectors and the answers provided by U.S. personnel, and the activities of inspectors (what equipment was photographed, on what did inspectors focus, etc.).

l. Detailed information and responsibilities of the liaison team are outlined in Appendix L. USEUCOM liaison team participant's instructions are outlined in Appendix M.

3. Evaluations. The purpose of the evaluation visit is to determine the accuracy of the annual information exchange. The VDOC 99 describes the evaluation as the "possibility to see the personnel and the major weapon and equipment systems of the unit reported in their normal locations." Evaluations are termed "active" in referring to the inspecting State and "passive" when referring to the inspected State.

a. Active Evaluations. DTRA will conduct evaluations of other OSCE States' information exchange. USEUCOM will assist, as appropriate, in coordination with DTRA-OSE.

b. Passive Evaluations. Information included in the annual exchange of military information is subject to evaluation on a quota basis. Active units and formations included in the information exchange are subject to evaluation in their normal peacetime locations. Non-active formations and combat units temporarily activated will be made available for evaluation during the period of temporary activation and in the area/location of activation.

(1) Notifications for VDOC 99 evaluations will be received by USEUCOM command center in the same manner as described above for passive inspections. USEUCOM command center will pass the evaluation notification information via telephone and electronic message at FLASH precedence to the appropriate component command operation center, DTRA-OSE, and designated ECJ5 arms control officers. Following receipt of the initial notification, the affected USEUCOM component command will ascertain the status of the unit to be evaluated, and within two hours, inform USEUCOM, ECJ5-T (or command center after duty hours), whether the unit will be available for evaluation. This rapid response is necessary to allow time to staff the decision, accept the visit, and reply to the visiting and host State within the required time.

(2) USEUCOM is responsible for compliance with VDOC 99 provisions in the conduct of the evaluation. The responsibility for preparation and implementation of U.S.-hosted evaluation programs is delegated to the component commands: USAREUR is responsible to prepare for and receive evaluation visits of U.S. ground forces and airborne activities; USAFE is responsible to prepare for and receive evaluation visits of USAFE activities; USNAVEUR is responsible to prepare for and receive evaluation visits of U.S. land-based naval air; and MARFOREUR is responsible to prepare for and receive evaluation visits of U.S. amphibious forces activities. USJFCOM is responsible to plan and prepare for and receive evaluation visits to U.S. forces/facilities in Iceland and the Azores.

(3) Planning to receive the evaluation team should include the possibility that the team will remain overnight, either prior to or after the evaluation.

(4) Units out-of-garrison can be declared unavailable for an evaluation visit. Units in garrison will generally be available for evaluation, although such a request can be denied on a limited basis. Such a denial will generally be done only for reasons of policy, decided in Washington. Although evaluations will usually be conducted in normal peacetime locations, the USG may elect to offer an evaluation of a unit located out-of-garrison; e.g., at the MTAs. In response to the initial notification, the component command should include a recommendation in these instances.

(5) The DTRA escort team chief acts as the senior USG representative for VDOC 99 evaluations. DTRA will also provide advice to the unit commander, as requested. DTRA is responsible for the activities of the U.S. escort team which accompanies evaluators and for contact with host State representatives. As the official USG representatives, DTRA will control all liaison/escorts and advise/assist the USEUCOM unit commander in the conduct of the evaluation. The USEUCOM unit commander is otherwise in charge and will be the final authority regarding the conduct of the visit on his installation.

(6) Evaluation teams will be accompanied at all times by representatives of the receiving State. USEUCOM component commands will provide at least two site guides to accompany the evaluation party. In accordance with existing bilateral agreements, up to two host State personnel plus one interpreter, if necessary, will be allowed on U.S. installations as members of the official escort team.

(7) The evaluation will commence with a briefing by the USEUCOM unit commander or deputy commander which describes the unit's major weapons, other equipment, and personnel status as reported in the last annual exchange of military information. The briefing should be based on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) site briefings, excluding purely CFE aspects, and may also include general descriptions of unit mission, training, exercises, and living conditions, etc. This information should be presented in a form which emphasizes the non-threatening nature of U.S. presence in Europe.

(8) Although only a briefing is required for formation evaluations, offers of visits to associated units of formations; e.g., if a division is visited, offer visits to the divisional cavalry squadron, a maintenance unit, an engineer unit, etc., are encouraged. Selection of units will be at discretion of the component command and should be based on physical proximity and availability. Personnel and equipment need not be placed on display for the evaluators. Access should be granted to normal, scheduled activities in a manner so that effect on normal activities is minimized.

(9) The evaluation team will be permitted to use cameras, dictaphones, and other permitted observation equipment outside of command posts, communications centers, and combat vehicles. Any restrictions on the right to take photographs should be announced at the point in question. General restrictions on photography of sensitive points should be explained during the briefing.

(10) Access may be denied to sensitive points, facilities, and equipment. The VDOC 99 allows relatively great flexibility in the designation of sensitive points. While the provision should not be abused, component commands will deny access, through the DTRA team chief, to all sensitive areas, equipment, and facilities without explanation to the evaluators, except to cite the sensitive point provisions of the VDOC 99 when denying access. Unit representatives will inform the DTRA escorts of such sensitive points, and DTRA will communicate access denial to the evaluators, as necessary.

(11) Commanders will ensure troops, other armed personnel, and officials in the formation or unit are adequately informed of their VDOC 99 obligations and how to conduct themselves during the course of the evaluation in addition to the presence, status, and functions of the members of the evaluation teams and , if applicable, auxiliary personnel. Additional guidance is contained in Appendix K.

(12) The evaluated unit or its senior headquarters will provide transportation for the evaluation team and escorts unless previously coordinated otherwise. Wheeled vehicles will generally suffice, but helicopters or fixed wing aircraft may be required/desirable if the evaluated unit/formation is in other than its normal peacetime location. The host country is responsible for transporting the evaluation team to the U.S. site and may make that transportation available to the unit for local transportation, if necessary.

(13) The safety of U.S. troops and the evaluation team is critical during the evaluation. With this consideration and at the discretion of the component command, the unit may offer evaluators the opportunity to participate in some aspect of unit training, such as small arms firing, weapon system simulators, or vehicle driving/rides, etc. The evaluators should seek to minimize disruption of normal unit activities during the evaluation.

(14) A written report containing the same elements required following an air base visit is required. Copies will be submitted to USEUCOM/ECJ5-T within 30 days of the evaluation visit.

## Appendix K

Guidance for USEUCOM personnel who have contact  
with Vienna Document 1999 Inspectors/Evaluators/Observers

1. USEUCOM will meet its VDOC 99 obligations. In addition to meeting the letter of the document, USEUCOM's position is to live up to the spirit of the VDOC 99 as well. Therefore, as hosts or co-hosts to VDOC 99 inspectors/evaluators/observers, USEUCOM personnel will demonstrate a high level of military bearing, and within security, OPSEC, and force protection requirements, reflect openness and transparency.
2. Commanders are responsible for the conduct of their personnel who have contact with VDOC 99 inspectors/evaluators/observers.
3. Only escorted VDOC 99 inspectors/evaluators/observers are authorized to visit U.S. units and interact with USEUCOM personnel.
4. Personnel who may potentially have contact with VDOC 99 inspectors/evaluators/observers will be briefed on the expected standards of conduct. Briefings will contain, at a minimum:
  - a. Security, OPSEC, and force protection requirements will be observed at all times.
  - b. Inspectors/evaluators/observers will be shown appropriate military courtesy.
  - c. Within security and OPSEC considerations, personnel may answer VDOC 99 inspectors/evaluators/observers' questions. Personnel will not provide information other than succinct answers to the specific question. If personnel do not know the answer, the response will be "I do not know, sir/ma'am."
  - d. Personnel may answer personal questions; e.g., name, rank, home town, military specialty, generic unclassified military duties, to the extent they feel comfortable in providing the information.
  - e. If there is any doubt about if information is appropriate to provide to VDOC 99 inspectors/evaluators/observers, personnel will seek guidance from the chain of command or DTRA-E escorts prior to providing the information.

## Appendix L

## Liaison Team Responsibilities

1. As national command element for U.S. forces in theater, USEUCOM ensures full USG compliance with the VDOC 99. This responsibility includes assistance in safeguarding U.S. and NATO interests during inspections. The fluid nature of application of the VDOC 99, intentionally vague language in some provisions, uneven familiarity of U.S. forces with the inspection process, deficiency in language qualifications, and need to standardize inspection procedures call for the presence of liaison officers, provided by DTRA and USEUCOM, during passive inspections. USEUCOM personnel who assist the DTRA liaison team also must be familiar with the VDOC 99 and USG policy on its application, but must be particularly knowledgeable on participating U.S. forces and planned exercise activity. Liaison teams will be provided to U.S. forces participating in exercises whenever possible.
2. The HN is responsible for hosting the inspection, including escorting the inspectors, but the U.S. may be asked to provide assistance with this task. Component commands will be informed of such requirements as soon as possible.
3. With HN concurrence, the U.S. may be invited to join and accompany the escort team. Otherwise, a DTRA liaison team will be sent to U.S. forces locations in the inspection specified area. In either case, the team mission is to provide guidance to U.S. forces on compliance with the VDOC 99. The team will establish liaison with HN officials, provide them data on sensitive and restricted U.S. installations and activities, and assist as requested. Depending on HN escort team reaction, the role of the team should then become subordinate in nature, remaining at the command post/element of the senior U.S. commander or other location as the commander directs to be able to field questions and provide advice on any situation that may arise. The liaison team will be sensitive to HN sovereignty and prerogatives, and the team should be referred to as liaison officers rather than escorts. The liaison team has every right to be present when U.S. forces are encountered during the inspection, but will not attempt to shadow the escort party if not invited to do so by the HN. Liaison officers will not initiate direct contact with inspectors without consent of HN escort officers. The team may use cameras and dictaphones to record inspector contacts with U.S. forces. The liaison team will submit an after action report through U.S. channels to USEUCOM documenting the liaison mission.
4. The liaison team composition will be determined by DTRA, but will normally consist of two to four personnel depending on the size and scope of the exercise and HN sensitivity.
  - a. Component commands will be prepared to provide officers who are knowledgeable of the activity being inspected, including its participants, the deployment and redeployment schedule, and all details which would be given in an exercise notification. The liaison team may provide a briefing to escorts based on this information. Component commands will send names and passport information on their representative(s) to DTRA-OSE.
  - b. A U.S. DAO representative may also be requested by DTRA to join the team. In countries where known problems exist, arrangements should be made for consultative meetings between liaison personnel and HN military representatives in advance of scheduled exercise

activities. The importance of the U.S. DAO role in representing USG interests in this matter cannot be overemphasized. Additional guidance for U.S. DAOs concerning the liaison duty follows:

- (1) Experience has shown that the liaison effort may require up to two U.S. DAO representatives participating with the liaison team. This requirement will be coordinated between DTRA and the appropriate U.S. DAO in advance or, at the latest, when news of an inspection is received.
  - (2) U.S. DAO representatives who will act as liaison officers must become familiar with the VDOC 99, U.S. military activity, exercise participants, and sensitive points, but their primary contribution will be familiarity with HN points of contact through which the liaison team can work to accomplish its mission. U.S. DAO representatives will also be counted on for HN language capability.
  - (3) U.S. DAO representatives should expect to live in the field with U.S. forces, should this be required. The uniform for liaison work will be the battle dress uniform (BDU), or equivalent utility uniform, with soft cap.
  - (4) Requirements to relay messages or requests for assistance, such as hotel reservations for liaison team members, may be passed to the U.S. DAO.
  - (5) In countries where the U.S. Defense Representative is not the U.S. DAO, the U.S. DAO will keep the U.S. Defense Representative fully apprised of all aspects of CSBM verification actions.
- c. In the event an inspection occurs, the liaison team will establish communications with U.S. forces in the specified area as soon as possible, through the appropriate component command. The affected component command will identify a point of contact with 24-hour telephone access for coordination with the liaison team and will provide this information to USEUCOM and DTRA as soon as the inspection notice is received. Internal exercise planning should routinely include this information as well.

## Appendix M

## USEUCOM Liaison Team Members Instructions

1. Duty on a VDOC 99 liaison mission is an interesting and often difficult task. The fact that you are working with allies on their sovereign territory makes the task complicated and requires that you be sensitive to Allied sovereignty and prerogatives. As a liaison officer, you represent the United States Government.
2. Mission. You will assist DTRA in providing guidance to U.S. forces in the specified inspection area concerning compliance with the VDOC 99. Under the direction of the DTRA team chief, you will establish liaison with HN officials, provide data on sensitive points and restricted areas such as U.S. installations and activities, and otherwise assist as requested.
3. Execution. You will safeguard U.S. interests and facilitate execution of U.S. obligations incurred under the VDOC 99, by advising U.S. commanders of appropriate or required actions, by providing information to host country escorts concerning U.S. sensitive points or restricted areas, and by providing other assistance as requested. If necessary, or at the initiative of host country escorts, you may communicate directly with inspectors when they inspect U.S. activities, areas, or units.
  - a. Liaison team will be sensitive to HN sovereignty and prerogatives. It is U.S. policy that, while the host State receives the inspection, all participating forces are the subject of an inspection and, as a participating State, the U.S. has obligations regarding the inspection. It is important that you establish communications with HN escorts as soon as possible after your arrival in order to coordinate with them, to re-emphasize the limited nature of your mission, and to lay the ground work for accomplishing that mission. Be tactful and diplomatic. You will assist DTRA by establishing communications with USEUCOM as required and coordinating USEUCOM component command assistance or support as necessary.
  - b. While you may respond to any inspector questions, direct contact with inspectors will be initiated only after coordination with the HN escort officers.
  - c. DTRA will provide you with cameras and dictaphones, if necessary, to record events that may arise in dispute and to facilitate preparation of the after action report. Do not use cameras excessively, keeping in mind that both inspectors and hosts may be sensitive to your presence. The team will submit a report which documents any disputes or problem areas arising between inspectors, escorts, and U.S. forces.
  - d. As the liaison team is a U.S. responsibility, all support will be arranged through U.S. channels, i.e., through USEUCOM and the local USDAO. NATO channels will not be used. If the HN chooses to include the U.S. liaison team with their escort group, including providing sleeping accommodations and meals, for example, these arrangements should be accepted in the interests of facilitating the team mission. The team members should pay for these arrangements. If the HN refuses such payment, team members may accept HN support (food, lodging, and travel). If the HN escorts do not offer such arrangements, the DTRA team chief will coordinate the approach to be taken to ensure the team knows the inspecting group's movements.

e. In some situations, the liaison team may not be permitted to join the inspecting group, and HN escorts may not communicate with the liaison team. In such circumstances, the liaison team must be very sensitive to HN prerogative; the best approach may be to advise the senior U.S. commander of his responsibilities, suggest, if necessary, that your guidance be disseminated through the chain of command, and locate the team so the members stand the best chance of being present at contacts between inspectors and U.S. forces.

f. If the team is not with the escort group, it is best to collocate with U.S. forces where you can be easily contacted. In unusual cases, accommodations may have to be sought at a nearby hotel, rather than with U.S. forces. The DTRA team chief will decide how to position you as liaison team members with U.S. forces. Do not attempt to follow the inspection team group if you are not welcomed officially as part of it.

g. Unit commanders will inform the liaison team of sensitive points/areas. The DTRA team/sub-team chief will inform the inspectors of access denial as necessary. Liaison officers should advise commanders to keep the declaration of sensitive points or restricted areas to a minimum, but should do so whenever classified or sensitive activity or locations require such protection. Sensitive points, particularly the presence of those which may be mobile (command posts, for example), should be made known to HN officials before the start of the inspection to reduce the number of unknown variables. U.S. liaison personnel will work closely with host State escorts to provide maximum necessary protection for classified or sensitive activities, facilities, or information.

h. U.S. commanders and troops will defer to you in most instances because of your expert knowledge on the VDOC 99 and your experience with its implementation. Keep in mind, however, that your authority is limited, and you will have to resolve challenges through coordination with unit commanders, DTRA, and USEUCOM.

4. Summary: Be tactful and diplomatic. Defer to HN officials whenever appropriate. Keep a low profile. Establish and maintain communications with DTRA-OSE and USEUCOM.